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Abstract 
We argue that while digital health technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence, smartphones, and virtual 
reality) present significant opportunities for improving the delivery of healthcare, key concepts 
that are used to evaluate and understand their impact can obscure significant ethical issues related 
to patient engagement and experience. Specifically, we focus on the concept of empowerment and 
ask whether it is adequate for addressing some significant ethical concerns that relate to digital 
health technologies for mental healthcare. We frame these concerns using five key ethical 
principles for AI ethics (i.e. autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, and explicability), 
which have their roots in the bioethical literature, in order to critically evaluate the role that digital 
health technologies will have in the future of digital healthcare.  
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Introduction 
The way that healthcare services are set to operate is likely to change drastically over the next 
decade as a result of key digital health technologies (DHTs) (e.g. telemedicine, wearables and 
smartphones, artificial intelligence, and genomics). Some of these technologies are being deployed 
within formal healthcare settings and are already impacting the way that patients access healthcare 
services (e.g. telemedicine and digital therapies), how they are monitored or diagnosed (e.g. 
sensors/wearables, smartphones, social media), and how healthcare services are governed and 
administered (e.g. electronic health records, machine learning) (The Topol Review Board, 2019). 
Other technologies are being used by individuals in more informal ways, embedded within their 
daily activities as part of a more personal concern for self-tracking of health and well-being 
(Lupton, 2016).  
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In this paper, we explore the ethical impact of some of these key technologies and the 
concepts used to critically evaluate them, focusing primarily on their role in mental healthcare in 
the United Kingdom—though many of the issues we discuss are applicable to wider healthcare 
services. According to the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (NatCen Social Research, 2016), 
one in six adults surveyed in England in 2014 met the criteria for a common mental disorder 
(CMD).1 The World Health Organisation (WHO) also notes that depression is the single largest 
contributor to global disability and a major contributor to suicide deaths, which number close to 
800 000 per year. As part of NHS England’s long-term plan, significant investment for mental 
health services has been promised, with data and technology set to play a central role in 
transforming their delivery (NHS England, 2019). This investment is vital, as mental healthcare is 
in urgent need of new approaches, and digital technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), will 
likely have a critical role in easing the burden that mental health conditions have on individuals 
and society. Furthermore, this specific focus is important from a parity of care perspective, in 
order to ensure that the opportunities associated with DHTs are equally distributed. However, 
aiming for parity does not mean that we should assume the implications, both positive and 
negative, of the increasing use of DHTs are equal. Mental healthcare poses unique ethical 
challenges due to the need to consider wider psychological and social factors, many of which 
interact with biological factors in complex ways that are not fully understood2. We approach these 
challenges from the perspective of a broader concern about the nature of patient empowerment—a 
concept that has received a large amount of attention in recent years (Chiauzzi et al., 2016; Spencer, 
2015; Bravo, Barr, Scholl, Elwyn, & McAllister, 2015)—and in relation to the key technologies 
identified as having a central role to play in the delivery of mental healthcare services.  
In section 1, we discuss the idea that technology can empower service users to take charge 
of their own digitally-mediated care, supported by myriad streams of user-generated data and co-
curated with various DHTs, including AI. This idea has caught the attention of many developers, 
stakeholders, and policy makers, but the empowerment narrative rests on some questionable 
conceptual and ethical foundations. We will argue that genuine empowerment depends on the 
prior removal of certain barriers to engagement, which patients suffering from a variety of mental 
health conditions face. To support this argument, in section 2, we adopt a bioethical perspective 
in order to critically evaluate the role that DHTs play in removing these barriers, as well as the 
                                                 
1 The report defines a CMD as comprising different types of depression and anxiety, which cause marked emotional 
distress and interfere with daily function, but do not usually affect insight or cognition. CMDs are typically contrasted 
with major psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia (NatCen Social Research, 2016).  
2 For instance, the acknowledgement that “neurobiology does not fully account for the emergence of mental distress”  
formed the basis of one of the criticisms brought against the DSM-V in an open letter signed by 15000 individuals of 
50 professional organisations (Kamens, Elkins, & Robbins, 2017, p. 682). 
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possible unintended consequences that arise from their implementation. In section 3, we stress 
that if harder governance measures are adopted to protect people from the unintended 
consequences that present the highest level of risk, these measures must be developed in a way 
that is tolerant of value pluralism. In section 4, we conclude with a brief summary of the main 
points discussed in the article. 
 
1 Mental Health and Empowerment 
A recent review commissioned by the previous UK Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, 
Jeremy Hunt, explores how technological developments are likely to impact the future of 
healthcare in the NHS (The Topol Review Board, 2019). Included alongside this review is an 
individual report that focuses specifically on mental healthcare and the key DHTs3 that are 
identified as likely to have a significant impact over the next 20 years (Foley & Woollard, 2019). 
The role and scope of these technologies differs widely but the report notes that they “have the 
potential to reduce the administrative burden, allow treatment in more convenient settings, and 
empower patients and their carers to take on some of the tasks currently performed in the clinic” 
(Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 25, emphasis added).  
The use of the term ‘empower’ here is important, and reflects a growing emphasis and 
usage of the concept, most notably within the literature discussing digital health and well-being 
(Burr, Taddeo, & Floridi, 2019; Morley & Floridi, 2019). In the case of mental healthcare, a 
significant challenge for promoting empowerment is the fact that certain psychiatric disorders 
impact the individual’s decisional capacity, affecting their choice of whether to engage with some 
service (e.g. an online CBT programme), or, more broadly, restricting their ability to make their 
own healthcare decisions.4 Different disorders impact decisional capacity in myriad ways. For 
instance, in a review of the medical ethical and empirical literature on depression and decisional 
capacity, Hindmarch et al. (2013) found that being in a depressive episode impacts an individual’s 
ability to appreciate the significance of information that may be relevant to healthcare decisions. In 
other words, information that may be treated similarly from a quantitative perspective (i.e. it is of 
equal quality and quantity) is not always the same from a qualitative perspective (in terms of 
meaning) (Floridi, 2010). The latter perspective depends on the individual who is consuming the 
information, as well as the prior beliefs they bring to bear on the information, how it is perceived 
                                                 
3 The 13 DHTs the report identifies are telemedicine, sensors/wearables, smartphones, digital therapies, social media, 
genotyping microarrays, neuroimaging, electronic health records and patient health records, healthcare data 
collections, natural language processing, artificial intelligence, virtual reality (VR), and augmented reality (AR) 
4 Typically, decisional capacity is divided into four sub-categories: the capacity to express a choice, the ability to 
understand relevant information, the ability to appreciate the significance of the information, and the ability to reason 
with the information (Charland, 2015; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998). 
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and what affordances arise between the user and their environment (Nagy & Neff, 2015). These 
types of assessment and considerations are important for identifying the specific barriers that exist 
in the case of specific mental health conditions, which may prevent DHTs from increasing patient 
empowerment.  
However, it is not sufficient to restrict our focus in this paper to the issues of decisional 
capacity alone—understanding and critically evaluating the concept of empowerment requires a 
broader focus. A key concern is that so-called ‘empowering technologies’ focus too narrowly on 
monitoring and providing information to an individual, on the assumption that a more informed 
process of deliberation is sufficient for empowerment (Morley & Floridi, 2019). However, there 
are many problems with this assumption.  
First, and foremost, it is not clear exactly how digitally-mediated access to information will 
empower people. This is primarily because, despite its common use, empowerment is a term that 
is used both loosely and inconsistently (Roberts, 1999) and is, consequently, embedded in a range 
of competing discourses that have highly variable aims: from the need to give people choice to the 
importance of providing people with an opportunity to change their position in society (Starkey, 
2003). All these variable conceptualizations are in use in the wider health promotion discourse 
(Sheehan, 2014) but, as has been highlighted elsewhere (Morley & Floridi, 2019), the narrative that 
is used in the context of digitising healthcare services (including mental health services) positions 
empowerment as a self-reflexive and transformative process (Garcia et al., 2014).  
 At first, this view of empowerment might not appear to be problematic. Indeed, there have 
been some early findings that this process can result in, at least moderate, positive impacts on the 
mental health of adolescents (Kenny, Dooley, & Fitzgerald, 2015) if appropriate evidence-based 
design recommendations are followed (Bakker, Kazantzis, Rickwood, & Rickard, 2016). This 
means that mental health-focused DHTs that aim to ‘empower’ individuals by taking action to 
actively improve their mental health through a process of self-reflection are likely to play an 
important part in the future of mental health care, especially in terms of making mental health 
support more accessible and reducing barriers to seeking help (Bakker et al., 2016). These 
opportunities should not be ignored. However, this conception of empowerment raises unique 
ethical issues, such as how it can be leveraged in ways that overlook socioeconomic factors that 
determine whether an individual can benefit from the use of a mental health DHT in the manner 
described. Moreover, the self-reflexive process presumes that an individual actively wants and feels 
able to engage with the process in the first place (e.g. to download an app, open it and register a 
user name)—this presumption is far from guaranteed in a wide variety of mental health disorders. 
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Thus, the overarching argument tends to ignore the fact that there are many factors that moderate 
an individual’s ability and motivation to even engage with this active process of self-reflection. 
 Such moderating factors (or variables) are well articulated by the Engagement Capacity 
Model (ECM) (Sieck, Walker, Retchin, & McAlearney, 2019), which stresses that an individual may 
fail to engage with healthcare services if they feel unable to do so due to (a) low resources, (b) low 
self-efficacy (competence), or (c) low willingness. These variables are themselves the result of a 
dynamic interplay between an individual, their environment, and the corresponding behaviours 
creating a complex feedback loop where each of these factors constantly influence each other. For 
example, a change in an individual’s environment, such as a reduction in income and consequential 
decision that paying for a smartphone contract is no longer affordable, might reduce the amount 
of resources they feel they have available to them to improve their mental health, in turn reducing 
their level of willingness to engage with the mental health services that are available (e.g. those 
accessible via a desktop computer at the library), making them less likely to consider engaging with 
the self-reflexive process of empowerment, and as a consequence lowering the confidence they 
have in their capacity (self-efficacy) to take the steps necessary to improve their mental health.  
Genuine empowerment, therefore, requires attending to the wider psychosocial factors 
that could constrain an individual’s ability to engage with healthcare services, both online and 
offline. For instance, far greater attention needs to be paid to the unequal distribution of mHealth 
resources throughout society and the existence of considerable perverse incentives within the 
system that will discourage the lowering of barriers to adoption. For example, while it may be 
better for the system and for the individual themselves to ‘self-treat’ at home through the use of a 
mindfulness app there are likely to still be incentives in the system for health practitioners to want 
to see the person in a clinical setting so that it generates a payment.  
Our intention, in highlighting these complex sociotechnical and (later) bioethical issues, is 
not to present the future of digitally-enhanced mental health service provision as dystopian or 
impossible to achieve. We believe that it is possible to capitalise on the opportunities presented by 
DHTs in a responsible manner, but this requires making it clear that DHTs are not neutral 
technologies.5 As such, there is a responsibility on all parts of the system to encourage the design 
of DHTs that, in complete awareness of the complex space within which they operate, actively re-
ontologise the way that mental health care services are delivered, with the goal of genuine 
                                                 
5 In (Morley & Floridi, 2019), one of the authors defends a view of framing DHTs as ‘digital companions’, which can 
have significant (positive and negative) effects on relationships key to maintaining positive mental health, such as 
those between: (a) clinical advice and behaviour change; (b) perception of self and behaviour change; (c) need for 
social interaction and desire to socialise. 
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improvement to the patient experience, as determined within the bounds of long-established 
bioethical principles that we will now discuss. 
 
2 Engagement and DHTs: Five Principles to Guide Critical Evaluation 
In this section we present several conceptual and ethical concerns that need to be addressed if we 
are to achieve the goal of increasing patient engagement and, in turn, empowerment. These 
concerns are structured according to the principles outlined in (Floridi et al., 2018), which comprise 
the four traditional principles of biomedical ethics [i.e. beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, 
and justice (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013)] as well as an additional principle (i.e. explicability) that 
is included to capture specific ethical issues that arise with the use of AI. These five principles were 
found to be well-represented in several significant policy documents that address the ethical issues 
with AI (see Floridi et al., 2018), and are well-suited to the present article because of their 
grounding in biomedical ethics.  
 
2.1. Autonomy 
In biomedical ethics, the principle of autonomy incorporates respect for both an individual’s right 
to decide and freedom of whether to decide (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013). The motivation behind the 
latter component, as Sen (2010, p. 18) notes, is that “[t]he freedom to choose our lives can make 
a significant contribution to our well-being, but going beyond the perspective of well-being, the 
freedom itself may be seen as important […] we are under no obligation to seek only our own 
well-being, and it is for us to decide what we have good reason to pursue.” In short, although 
humans have a right to decide, we also have the freedom to choose how and whether to exercise 
that right. However, freedom alone is insufficient for autonomy—agency is also required and 
provides the basis for social recognition of one’s right to decide, including the capacity to express 
informed consent.   
 Contemporary theories of relational autonomy maintain that an individual’s agency, or 
capacity for intentional action, is in large part determined by their sociocultural environment.6 
These approaches contrast with procedural accounts of autonomy, which view autonomous 
decision-making in more cognitivist terms and may downplay the significance of the wider 
environmental dynamics that contribute to overt choice behaviour (see Owens & Cribb, 2013 for 
a discussion). 
                                                 
6 A related idea is captured in the well-known capability approach, which focuses on the real opportunities for action 
that different sociocultural environments afford, the individual differences in people’s abilities (or capacity) to 
transform resources in ways conducive to their well-being, and the unequal distribution of such opportunities 
throughout society (Sen, 2010). 
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Relational theories of autonomy help bring into stark relief the need to design and evaluate 
DHTs at a level of abstraction that articulates the socially embedded (or situated) nature of the 
user, in order to fully appreciate the interpersonal differences in capacity for engagement (e.g. time 
demands, literacy levels, finances, social support). For example, Lucas et al. (2017, p. 2, emphasis 
added) explored whether virtual human interviewers could “increase willingness of service members 
to report PTSD symptoms”, by reducing barriers to engagement that may result from the 
perceived stigma that comes from reporting symptoms to a human interviewer. They show how 
such a technology has the potential to increase an individual’s relational autonomy, by creating a 
wider set of opportunities for seeking treatment and respecting the barriers to engagement that 
certain mental health conditions present—in this case the barrier was low willingness caused by a 
concern regarding perceived stigma. In this manner, retaining an emphasis on relational autonomy 
may help ensure that DHTs do not end up embodying overly-individualistic values of what it 
means to ‘live well’ but rather help demonstrate the prudential value of social relatedness.  
Thus, although DHTs can create new opportunities available to individuals by altering the 
landscape of affordances that a user perceives (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014), respect for individual 
autonomy also requires acknowledgement of the different values that individuals bring to bear 
when choosing whether to engage. This is often embodied in the idea that the right to choose is 
not a duty to choose (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013). This aspect of autonomy can cause difficulties 
for technology designers and developers, as well as the healthcare professionals that use their 
products. Two concerns are significant. 
Firstly, there is a concern that can arise when insufficient consideration is given to the 
scope of autonomy. For example, a patient may autonomously decide to disempower themselves, in 
order to have someone else (e.g. their doctor or caregiver) make decisions on their behalf. 
Alternatively, an individual experiencing depression may be fully informed about their mental 
health and the options available to them in terms of recovery, but nevertheless autonomously 
decide not to engage with the variety of DHTs available to them—their mental health may be an 
important part of their self-identity and how they make sense of the world.7 Examples such as 
these pose challenges for determining the efficacy of a DHT. As White et al. (White, Imperiale, & 
Perera, 2016, p. 2) note, delivering mental health services is problematised by the challenge of 
specifying what constitutes a “‘good outcome’ for people in the particular contexts in which they 
are living their lives”. An individual may autonomously decide that their own journey of recovery 
                                                 
7 This perspective is captured by the recovery approach (Anthony, 1993, p. 527), which maintains that recovery “is a 
deeply personal, unique process of changing one’s attitudes, values, feelings, goals, skills, and/or roles. It is a way of 
living a satisfying, hopeful, and contributing life even with limitations caused by illness. Recovery involves the 
development of new meaning and purpose in one’s life as one grows beyond the catastrophic effects of mental illness.”  
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requires learning to live within acceptable limitations that are intrinsically chosen and governed, 
rather than based on extrinsic and optimal standards represented by the outcome measure chosen 
by the healthcare provider.  
 Secondly, there is a concern that can arise when too much consideration is given to the 
scope of autonomy. For example, if a technology developer focuses too narrowly on the day-to-
day decisions of a user (e.g. whether to adhere to a self-directed course of therapy delivered via an 
mHealth technology), they may fail to appreciate how a single decision fits within a patient’s 
broader healthcare regime. As (Kukla, 2005, p. 37) states: “The bulk of our health care activities 
take the form, not of crisis management and punctate decision-making, but of ongoing practices, 
including large amounts of self-management and surveillance, wherein we are inducted into 
standards set by medical institutions with which we have prescribed forms of direct contact.” The 
point here is that the individual decision of whether to adhere to a course of treatment on any day, 
typically made multiple times during a course of treatment, may be the wrong level of abstraction 
to focus on when determining whether a user’s autonomy is respected. The meaningful choice that 
requires consideration is the initial choice of whether to engage in a course of treatment and how 
to integrate the treatment into ongoing practices, as opposed to the subsequent choices that may 
result from individual prompts (or nudges)—perhaps delivered via smartphone notifications and 
serving to remind a user to continue with a self-determine course of therapy (e.g. CBT).  
 
2.2. Beneficence  
The principle of beneficence typically emphasises the promotion of patient welfare but can also 
be extended to include the welfare of the caregivers. Consideration of how to ‘do good’ in the 
context of healthcare and DHTs, therefore, need not, and perhaps should not, be limited to the 
individual patient—deploying a new DHT in a healthcare pathway can be highly beneficial for 
patients, but could prove to be overly-demanding for clinical staff.  
Novel technologies are creating new opportunities to ‘do good’, by unlocking possible 
treatment options that did not exist previously (Fernández-Caballero et al., 2017). However, 
ensuring that the principle of beneficence is upheld when designing, implementing, and using 
DHTs requires that we have some way of measuring a wide range of outcomes and that the 
measures used are suitable for the context in which they are deployed (e.g. clinical, epidemiological, 
or allocational decisions)8. This can prove to be challenging for a number of reasons.  
                                                 
8 See (Hausman, 2015) for an argument that claims that no single measure can adequately capture the value of health 
outcomes across all three contexts.    
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In order to determine whether DHTs ‘do good’ it is important to consider how effective 
they are in bringing about their stated goals—this includes a comparative evaluation against relevant 
existing services. However, depending on the type of comparative analysis being conducted, 
certain measures may prove to be limited. For instance, alongside other key performance indicators 
that commissioners use to assess the overall quality of care, patient-reported outcome measures 
(PROMs) can provide a valuable source of information about a patient’s subjective attitudes 
towards a procedure or treatment. As Nelson et al. (2015, p. 1) notes, “the systematic use of 
information from PROMs leads to better communication and decision making between doctors 
and patients and improves patient satisfaction with care”. However, PROMs can be either specific 
or generic, and in the case of the former, can be specific in myriad ways (e.g. disease- or condition-
specific, population-specific)9. This leads to certain constraints on their applicability. For instance, 
if the PROM has been validated for a specific population (e.g. elderly patients) this can rule out 
comparisons with the wider population due to differences in the dimensions being assessed (e.g. 
an instrument for measuring adolescent well-being will focus on different factors from well-being 
of elderly patients due to different expectations concerning typical levels of functioning.  
DHTs, such as sensors/wearables, smartphones, and social media are enabling new forms 
of data collection and measurement when combined with techniques such as big data analytics and 
machine learning. However, DHTs are not immune to the aforementioned limitations on 
measurement, and technology designers must consider what to measure and how best to measure 
it during the design process. Furthermore, technology designers also face additional ethical 
challenges that go beyond the choice of measurement tool.   
One such challenge, is the need to balance the evidence-standard required of health 
interventions, exemplified by the reproducible results of randomised-controlled trials, with the 
opportunity presented by DHTs to deliver far more personalised care.  If too much emphasis is 
put on optimising the outcome for an individual ‘user’ during the designing, testing and evaluating 
phases, then it would be ethically wrong to launch that product at scale on the market—where it 
would be used by individuals with grossly different socioeconomic circumstances—due to the 
chances of it having a negative impact on those that do not match the ‘profile’ of the individual 
for which it was tailored. If, however, the opposite was true and the focus was on reproducibility 
of the results, we risk missing the opportunity to improve outcomes for individuals who have 
more specific needs that have, up until now, been unmet by the provision of generic mental health 
services.  
                                                 
9 Examples can be found at: http://phi.uhce.ox.ac.uk/inst_types.php  
Page 10 of 29 
Another key ethical concern is that although subjective reports are a valuable source of 
information about how a patient may evaluate the positive impact of some intervention, treatment 
or therapy, the way the information is collected, stored, and used could raise concerns among 
users. This is especially important in the case of mental health, where concerns over privacy can 
be particularly significant. For instance, a DHT designer may be aware that some biometric signals 
carry mutual information about an individual’s mood or emotional state or that natural language 
processing techniques can be used to infer information about common mental health disorders 
such as depression and anxiety (Burr & Cristianini, 2019). Moreover, they may be aware that such 
techniques can be used to bypass the need for explicit user input (e.g. completion of a 
questionnaire), allowing them to be used at scale without high costs. Although the reliability and 
validity of using digital footprints or biometric signals to bypass traditional forms of psychometric 
assessment is currently inadequate for clinical use, this does not prevent the use of such techniques 
in the wider ecosystem of mHealth apps and IoT devices (Bellet & Frijters, 2019). As such, from 
the perspective of a designer, the decision not to utilise such techniques within a health and 
wellness app could be judged as a missed opportunity and a failure to “do good”.  
However, the use of such a technique to measure the effectiveness of a possible 
intervention may not necessarily be seen the same way by the user, who may have decided to 
present themselves in public in such a way that their mental health condition is not obvious to 
their friends, family or colleagues. This ability to choose the “face” we wear in public, therefore, 
could be undermined by a designer’s attempt to use novel techniques (e.g. big data and machine 
learning) to measure our inner lives by bypassing the need for explicit feedback (e.g. a self-reported 
questionnaire) (Bellet & Frijters, 2019; Burr & Cristianini, 2019). In turn, the discovery of such 
techniques by a user, who may have wished to keep their mental health condition private, could 
lead to self-surveillance of future online interactions that end up overriding the initial desire to “do 
good”.10 The simple point here, well-known to bioethicists, is that consideration of how best to 
meet the principle of beneficence goes hand in hand with a requirement of considering the possible 
risks of harm. 
 
2.3. Non-Maleficence 
Avoiding harm is sometimes treated as an overriding principle in the delivery of healthcare (i.e. 
‘above all do no harm’), although there are many instances of where this fails to be useful in 
practice and sometimes morally indefensible in principle (see Beauchamp & Childress, 2013). As 
                                                 
10 This is likely one of the primary motivations behind the backlash to a study by Facebook that demonstrated how 
user’s emotional states could be manipulated (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock, 2014). 
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such, it is typically agreed in bioethics that independent of context, there is no a priori rank ordering 
of the norms of beneficence and non-maleficence. Nevertheless, the bias towards the principle of 
non-maleficence can be seen in the NICE Evidence Standards Framework, which is used for 
evaluating DHTs deployed in the NHS and places a significant emphasis on demonstrating how 
proposed DHTs should be evaluated according to the proportional risk that their use would pose 
within the healthcare system (Greaves et al., 2018). The framework is founded on a proportionate 
approach to risk, which categorises DHTs according to their function so that more rigorous 
standards are applied to DHTs that have the potential for causing greater harm. For example, 
DHTs that are designed for ‘active monitoring’ of patients—included in the highest risk tier of the 
framework—should ideally be supported by a high-quality randomised controlled study that 
demonstrates how the DHT has comparative utility according to relevant clinical outcomes in the 
target population, using validated condition-specific measures. Again, here we see the need to 
consider the scope of measures deployed for assessing DHTs and their potential impacts on 
service users (see previous section).  
Unfortunately, the NICE framework notes that its evaluative scope is limited and less 
relevant to DHTs that are “downloaded or purchased directly by users (such as through app 
stores)” and is “not [yet] designed for use with DHTs that incorporate artificial intelligence using 
adaptive algorithms” (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2018). This limited scope 
is understandable when we consider the variation in standards of due care that are relied upon in order 
to avoid negligence. In the first instance, an app developer does not have the same professional 
duty of care to an individual that a doctor does to a patient. In the second, the adaptive nature of 
the algorithms in question may place epistemic limits on the duty of care that can be exercised due 
to the lack of explainability inherent in some forms of AI (Watson et al., 2019). Nevertheless, the 
fact that app developers are not yet beholden to the same duty of care that governs the obligations 
of a formal caregiver does not mean that they are exempt from giving appropriate consideration to 
possible risks and benefits that their product may cause. How we delineate and specify the concept 
of ‘appropriate consideration’ though, must instead make reference to a broader ethics of social 
responsibility. It is, perhaps, for these reasons that so many organisations are currently at work 
trying to specify codes of conduct (Department of Health and Social Care, 2019) or empirically-
informed design guidelines (Calvo & Peters, 2014), which can help provide ethical support for the 
development and use of DHTs in wider contexts.  
A central challenge for the development of such ethical frameworks is how to deal with 
trade-offs between maximising opportunities and minimising risks. Several specific trade-offs arise 
in relation to the over-use and under-use of DHTs for mental health.  
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Firstly, and in relation to the over-use of DHTs, while there is broad consensus that CBT is 
an effective treatment for common mental health disorders such as anxiety and depression, CBT 
is not harmless. As such, there are potential risks that could emerge from over-use of DHTs for 
CBT, such as deterioration of existing symptoms, emergence of new symptoms, and strains on 
family relations (Schermuly-Haupt, Linden, & Rush, 2018). Such risks may also help explain the 
findings of a study performed by Breedvelt et al. (2019), which analysed GP’s attitudes to mHealth 
interventions for depression, and found that GPs thought that unguided use of such interventions 
(e.g. automated self-care) is likely to be less effective than guided care. In short, although the 
proliferation of therapy-based apps may provide greater access, and in turn reduce barriers to 
engagement for those who need support, there is a trade-off between improved access or 
scalability on the one hand, and potential decrease in efficacy and possible increase in the risk of 
harm on the other.  
Another instance of the possible over-use of DHTs can be found in the ongoing debate 
around the automated monitoring of suicidal ideation on social media. Others have already raised 
concerns about the ethical challenges raised by mental health professionals using social media as a 
way of monitoring patients, including the tension between the principles of beneficence and non-
maleficence (Lehavot, Ben-Zeev, & Neville, 2012). A notable concern in relation to using DHTs 
to automatically monitor individuals is that the reliability and validity of such techniques is 
currently insufficient for clinical use (Burr & Cristianini, 2019). Therefore, there is a risk that if 
deployed at scale, such techniques would likely lead to a high-rate of false positives, which in turn 
could result in the over medicalisation and stigmatisation of otherwise healthy and normal 
attitudes, behaviours and cognitions.11  
Secondly, and in relation to the under-use of DHTs for mental health, it can be argued that 
an over-cautious approach to mitigating risk can stifle research and lead to harm by failing to 
advance treatment options. This is particularly relevant in the case of IoT devices and ubiquitous 
computing where there is a genuine opportunity to gather valuable environmental data (or 
‘ecologically valid’ data) that could help researchers to understand how the environment affects 
the presentation of mental health disorders. For instance, one epidemiological study used Google 
Trends data and NHS prescription data for antidepressants to explore the distribution and 
prevalence of seasonal affective disorder (Lansdall-Welfare, Lightman, & Cristianini, 2019), while 
another used Twitter data (i.e. NLP) to discover a diurnal variation in emotions (Lansdall-Welfare, 
                                                 
11 Such a concern is reminiscent of concerns raised in an open letter to the DSM-V, which noted how lowering 
diagnostic thresholds for certain categories (e.g. ADD) could lead to epidemiological inflation, and in some cases could 
lead to the inappropriate prescription of pharmacological substances to vulnerable populations (e.g. the use of 
neuroleptics in children diagnosed with disruptive mood dysregulation disorder). (Kamens, Elkins, & Robbins, 2017, 
p. 682)  
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Lightman, & Cristianini, 2019). Both of these population-level studies were done using publicly-
available datasets but required extensive forms of data collection and expensive data storage. 
Greater collaboration between researchers and technology companies who already have access to 
this data, as well as additionally valuable meta-data that is not publicly available, would likely extend 
our scientific and medical knowledge about possible risk factors for mental health disorders. It is 
also possible that, as more is understood about how environmental factors co-determine mental 
health, DHTs and the information that we gather from them could contribute to raising the 
standards of due care—as the evidence base grows the number of unintended consequences from 
lack of knowledge shrinks. This potential for DHTs, particularly those involving the use of artificial 
intelligence to spark human curiosity that can lead to better outcomes (Holm, 2019), is one reason 
why governments should take a proportionate risk-based approach to the ways in which such 
DHTs are regulated.  
 
2.4. Justice 
Although DHTs could be used to optimise back-end operational processes for efficiency purposes 
[e.g. to release time for clinicians to ensure the right care is delivered in the right place at the right 
time and to improve equity of care (Nelson, Herron, Rees, & Nachev, 2019)], it is also likely that 
their use will have impacts on society in ways that are unequally distributed. For instance, there 
could be economic inequalities [e.g. those who have to rely on free-apps are far more likely to 
experience privacy harms due to the exploitative monetisation of their data (Polykalas & 
Prezerakos, 2019)] or epistemic inequalities (e.g. those with higher levels of health and media 
literacy who are better placed to make use of developments). However, there are also more specific 
concerns that can be discussed. 
 In addition to DHTs that are employed and embedded within formal healthcare systems, 
there are many more DHTs that can be accessed through third-party services (e.g. app stores). The 
quality and variety of these DHTs is vast, including apps that teach mindfulness-based stress 
reduction, online community support forums, and services that connect users with chatbots or 
human wellness coaches. We here focus on the latter.  
 Wellness coaching often has similar goals to formal healthcare services and can include 
NLP-based chatbots that deploy some form of CBT or paid-for online services that connect users 
to another human. It has been reported that some of these services are reliant on unlicensed 
“coaches” who deliver simple forms of motivational therapy or emotional-health coaching (Barras, 
2019), rather than a clinically recognised form of mental health therapy. While improving access 
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on one level, and perhaps even extending the set of opportunities for engagement, these services 
also raise several ethical concerns.  
 Primarily these concerns stem from the fact that the logic underpinning many of these 
ideas is overly technologically deterministic, presenting the ‘problem’ of emotional wellbeing as 
something with a well-defined causal chain that can be ‘solved’ algorithmically (Janssen & Kuk, 
2016). This approach assumes that a DHT is a neutral collection of code and data rather than a 
node in much broader social system composed of human and artificial agents (Ananny & Crawford, 
2018), the impact of which needs to be assessed not in silico but in socio. When such a social systems 
approach to analysis (Crawford & Calo, 2016), instead of a product analysis, is taken it becomes 
much clearer that when the effects of many small, seemingly neutral, interactions (e.g. one user 
‘talking’ to an NLP-based chatbot) are aggregated at a societal level the impact can be morally 
significant (Floridi, 2013). For instance, if these chatbot or video-based consultation services do 
little more than provide paid-for access to someone to talk to, it can be argued that they end up 
commercialising (and perhaps replacing) an important social function that has typically been 
provided by friends and families. This could result in the commodification and diminishment of 
social relationships by reducing the opportunity for an actual friend to cultivate virtues such as 
empathy, or compassionate listening. Moreover, a genuine friend or family member may also be 
able to offer more insightful support, due to a wider understanding of the contextual factors (e.g. 
lifestyle, previous experiences). Alternatively, if these services end up drawing users away from 
formal healthcare services, which are governed by stricter evidence standards (see previous 
section), they could result in harm to the user due to inadequate care.  
Although aspects of these concerns may fall more naturally within the remit of the 
principle of non-maleficence (i.e. avoid harm), there is also a social justice concern related to the 
fact that these services may further increase social inequalities in access to forms of treatment by 
creating a market that is only available to segments of society, and perhaps more importantly, the 
compounding effects of isolation that result from shifting the burden of care. Here, the aggregate 
effect is the loss of community. People will rely less on their neighbours, friends and family to 
provide them with advice, which will give them less opportunities to build up trusting relationships 
that hold together divergent and contrasting views (Durante, 2010), and undermine the likelihood 
that responsibility (burden of care) for maintaining the wellbeing of each node (individual) is evenly 
distributed across the network (Floridi, 2016a). Instead, this responsibility is shifted solely to the 
individual, which can potentially be very damaging to that individual’s mental wellbeing for two 
primary, interconnected, reasons: (1) the individual becomes increasingly isolated, unable to 
benefit from the cathartic social support captured by the ‘a problem shared, is a problem halved’ 
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idiom; and (2) the individual feels too much backward-facing moral responsibility (blame) for 
having experienced a deterioration in their mental wellbeing and feels increasingly unable to 
interact with other ‘blameless’ individuals, resulting in further isolation (Wardrope, 2015).  
 
2.5. Explicability 
Much of the current literature about explicability in the context of artificial intelligence and ‘black-
box’ decision-making focuses on the need to make it possible for an individual to understand how 
an algorithm made a decision through the use of specific statistical or visualisation techniques such 
as Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME) (Ribeiro, Singh, & Guestrin, 2016) 
or SHapely Additive exPlanations (SHAP) (Lundberg & Lee, 2017)12. In the context of medical 
care, and particularly mental healthcare, this focus is necessary but not sufficient as it does not 
reflect the fact that explanations are social and contextual, about more than causal attribution 
(Miller, 2019), and reliant on meaningful dialogue between user, developer and model (Mittelstadt, 
Russell, & Wachter, 2019). In short, purely quantitative explanations fail to take into account the 
need to make a result, or specific piece of advice, meaningfully interpretable (or understandable to a 
specific end-user (Guidotti et al., 2018).  
What counts as interpretable, and therefore actionable, advice is not an agreed standard 
(Doshi-Velez & Kim, 2017; Dosilovic, Brcic, & Hlupic, 2018). Instead, what counts for one 
individual may not count as such to another individual with a different set of epistemic and 
normative standards, experiences, and baseline knowledge (Binns, 2018). This is particularly 
related to variance in health literacy level, which has been shown to have a significant influence on 
an individual’s ability to evaluate the quality, reliability and actionability of a healthcare information 
source (Chen et al., 2018). For example, those with lower health literacy levels are more likely to 
rely on social media sources of health advice, including mental health advice, than traditional online 
sources, such as websites providing clinically-validated information (Chen et al., 2018). This may 
be because, in the absence of an ability to determine the difference in credibility between the two 
sources, these individuals rely more heavily on bandwagon heuristics and conflate popularity (e.g. 
likes and shares) with credibility and reliability (Borah & Xiao, 2018). In the context of mental 
health, a lack of such considerations is particularly concerning as it means that those with low 
eHealth literacy, presented with conflicting information or recommendations about how to 
improve their health, are potentially more at risk than others of suffering from health anxiety (so-
                                                 
12 Both LIME and SHAP are methods that can be used to ‘explain’ the output of any machine learning model, typically 
used for ‘explaining’ classifiers.  
Page 16 of 29 
called ‘cyberchondria’) (McMullan, Berle, Arnáez, & Starcevic, 2019) and more vulnerable to poor-
quality and potentially harmful advice. 
This is a concern from an equity of care perspective due to the following cycle: (a) lower 
levels of eHealth literacy have been found to be associated with other disadvantaging 
sociodemographic factors (Paige, Krieger, & Stellefson, 2017); (b) individuals with a lower income 
are more likely to rely on unregulated (and free) online sources of mental health care provision; (c) 
the poorer quality of advice delivered through these unregulated services means that individuals 
are unlikely to see an improvement in their mental state; (d) this lowers their self-efficacy; (e) this 
lessens their willingness to engage with mental health services; (f) this increases the risk of these 
individuals feeling unable to participate in society, both socially and economically; which (g) lessens 
their chances of improving their circumstances or their eHealth literacy, creating a situation of 
cumulative disadvantage. As such, we can acknowledge the importance of keeping the patient as 
a key part of the decision-making process as much as possible, in order to mitigate the worst effects 
that result from a lack of awareness. 
The only way such nuances in design needs for mental health DHTs are going to be elicited 
is if the ‘users’ are treated as part of the solution, rather than as a problem that needs to be 
overcome (Aitken et al., 2019). This requires all parts of the system (e.g. designers, commissioners, 
policymakers, etc.), committing to the use of techniques such as those encapsulated under the 
headings of value sensitive design (Friedman, Hendry, & Borning, 2017) or  responsible research 
and innovation (Jirotka, Grimpe, Stahl, Eden, & Hartswood, 2017; Stahl & Wright, 2018a; Stilgoe, 
Owen, & Macnaghten, 2013), which stresses the importance of considered and extensive 
stakeholder engagement throughout the development, deployment and use of DHTs. Not only 
will such a commitment improve the design of the technology and ensure it achieves positive 
outcomes for its users [e.g. as DeepMind Health found by developing their Streams App with, 
rather than for, clinicians in the Royal Free Hospital (DeepMind Health, 2019)], but also meet the 
requirements of perceived usefulness and ease of use, to enhance the likelihood of adoption.   
Such engagement practices can, therefore, be seen as a way of improving the social 
responsibility of DHTs by encouraging their designers and commissioners to take into account 
the expectations of stakeholders with regards to the impacts of the DHT on individuals, society 
and the wider system (Zhao, 2018). As such they are a means of moving from principles to practice 
(Winfield & Jirotka, 2018) and are a key ‘tool’ in the governance toolbox alongside impact 
assessments, judicial review, model repositories (Edwards & Veale, 2018), and best practice 
guidelines or codes of conduct. However, in cases where the risks to end-users, in this case 
patients, are at their highest, it might be that these governance approaches are insufficient. For 
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example, Hall, Gertz, Amato, & Pagliari (2017) assessed the information for consumers’ of 15 
direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies available in the UK against the UK Human Genetics 
Commission (HGC) best practice principles and failed to find one provider compliant with all of 
the principles. Given that the results from these tests often include the statistical likelihood of the 
individual developing a specific disease, the risk posed to the individual’s psychological integrity 
by not presenting this information in an interpretable format, is quite high (Andorno, 2004). 
Instances of such high risk may result in calls for a move up from ethically-aligned standards to 
ethically-aligned regulation (Winfield & Jirotka, 2018). While this may well be necessary to protect 
patient safety, it is important that the transition from “soft ethics” to governance and legislation 
(Floridi, 2018) is done in a way that is proportionate and capable of producing regulation that is 
neither too semantically strict, flexible nor overly unpredictable (Arvan, 2018).  
 
3 Allowing for contextual flexibility  
All ethical principles, including the bioethical principles that we have used as a means of guiding 
our critique, constrain behaviours. However, the way that they constrain behaviours may not 
always be interpreted consistently across different contexts (e.g. between different cultures, 
peoples and organisations) (Turilli, 2007). This creates a tension between the need for universal 
principles, such as non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy, justice and explicability, and the need 
to respect differences in their implementation, application, and relative weighting of importance 
(Binns, 2018). For example, a clinical researcher might have a different interpretation of justice 
and give it a different weighting than a policy-maker. In addition, patients and clinicians are likely 
to interpret ‘harm’ (non-maleficence) differently.  
If regulation is designed in a way that makes the interpretation of these principles too 
‘strict’ it will limit society’s ability to reflect on them (i.e. flexibly interpret, discuss and evaluate), 
making it harder to judge whether or not they have been adequately applied in different 
circumstances (D’Agostino & Durante, 2018). However, if regulation is designed in a way that is 
too open to interpretation it will fail to protect society from the risks that have been highlighted 
(Floridi, 2016b). There is no simple or straightforward way out of this tension. Ethics in this sense 
is a practice of ongoing discussion and critical engagement, and as such any set of ethical guidelines 
or principles should be treated as “living documents” that require continuous investment to 
maintain (Floridi et al., 2018).  
 
4 Conclusion 
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Discussing the clinical applications of machine learning, Watson et al. note how the “opportunity 
costs of not using our best available tools for disease detection and treatment are substantial—12 
million people a year receive misdiagnoses in the United States, with about six million facing 
potential harm as a result. Nearly one third of all preventable deaths in the United Kingdom are 
attributable to misdiagnosis” (2019, p. 2). As we have demonstrated, additional opportunity costs 
exist in the context of failing to use DHTs effectively for delivering mental healthcare. However, 
to ensure that these opportunities are pursued in an ethically responsible manner, it is vital that 
those responsible for delivering healthcare understand the importance of framing the challenges 
in the appropriate way—the concepts we use matter. 
In this paper, we critically evaluated the concept of empowerment as it applies to DHTs 
and mental healthcare, showing how an insufficient consideration of wider psychological and 
socioeconomic factors runs the risk of missed opportunities for patient engagement and a 
misunderstanding of the role that key bioethical principles play in shaping healthcare delivery. 
Different mental health disorders will present different barriers to engagement and must be 
considered in relation to the situated nature of the individual concerned. To better articulate these 
concerns, we deployed five principles related to the ethical development and use of artificial 
intelligence, which are grounded in the literature on bioethics. These principles served as a 
structure to frame our discussion of some of the specific ethical issues that arise with the use of 
DHTs for mental healthcare—there will obviously be many more that we have not considered. It 
is well understood in the bioethical literature that these prima facie principles are general guidelines 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2013), which serve to establish more specific rules that could be used to 
assist the design and development of relevant DHTs. As such, they can only serve as a starting 
point in the ethical evaluation of specific technologies with specific uses in specific contexts. 
However, as we have shown, their higher-order level of abstraction can be of significant value in 
drawing attention to relevant ethical differences between the use of DHTs in healthcare systems 
broadly construed and the use of DHTs in the narrower context of mental healthcare.  
It is vital that we continue to scrutinise the design, development, and use of DHTs in all 
areas of healthcare. While traditional ethical principles will still play a valuable role, the novel 
features of DHTs (e.g. artificial intelligence) alter their nature and specificity when applied to these 
new contexts. Therefore, and to appropriate a term from computer science, if we wish to avoid 
creating vulnerabilities that arise from being locked-in to a legacy system of values we must be willing 
to regularly evaluate our use of normative concepts. If we fail to do this, we may be unable to 
determine whether DHTs are genuinely empowering all users or simply serving as a costly 
distraction that prevents our healthcare system from serving those who need the most support.  
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